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1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the success of official commemorations, the marked 
increase in academic publications, and the growing journalistic 
interest, one might ponder whether the thought of Michelstaedter 
has actually acquired any essential significance for the militant 
culture. But is it still meaningful to speak of a militant culture? Is 
it not true that institutions, universities, and the mass media oc-
cupy the entire cultural sphere? And is it not also true that Post-
modernism has sanctioned the end of the avant-gardes and estab-
lished a cultural pacifism within which there might be room for 
quarrels and connivances, but not for real conflicts or true relations? 
The two questions-namely, the one concerning the vitality 
[Translated from the Italian by Daniela Bini and Renate Holub] 
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and fecundity of Michelstaedter's thought, and the other concern-
ing the possibility of a militant culture-are, no doubt, closely 
connected. However, at first sight, the cultural climate and the 
collective sensibility of the present era do not seem to be favorably 
inclined towards the passionate and intransigent radicalism which 
animates Michelstaedter's work, as they do not seem to be favor-
ably inclined towards a culture which would give serious thought 
to the present, and to ways of changing it. Everything seems to 
be reduced nowadays to the daily tactical ministering of the 
spheres of feelings, interests, and ideas which appear to be obvi-
ous, taken for granted, and consented to. To say it with 
Michelstaedter, everything seems to adapt itself to a "sufficiency" 
of the given, to generalized "adulation," to a "league of scoun-
drels" in other words, to the triumph of "rhetorics" [rettorica] in 
life. 
However, does this analysis, which assigns to "rhetorics" 
centrality and power in this world, and which relegates "persua-
sion" to the far end of an outdated and impotent morality, does 
this analysis reflect indeed the present situation? Or is it perhaps 
the mechanical reproduction of a commonplace? In my view, it 
is quite simplistic to consider victory the synonym for "rhetoric," 
and defeat the synonym for "persuasion." Things are-or at least 
have become-somewhat more complex. 
Too often we forget that Michelstaedter's world of "rhetorics" 
is not only false and unjust, but also boring and melancholic. He 
writes: 
Since they do not possess anything and cannot give anything, the 
"rhetorics" people slip into words which feign communication: 
since they cannot put into effect that everyone be the world of the 
others, they counterfeit words in which to contain the absolute 
world, and they feed their boredom with words, and with words 
they create a poultice to soothe their pains. (Opere 61)* 
If the essential characteristic of "rhetorics" is the loss of the 
present, then melancholy is "the all-inclusive desire for a life which 
is no longer in the present; it is a desire for that complexity of 
desires which makes the life of the past useless" (796). It is here 
where we begin to note a difference between Michelstaedter' s 
time and our own . We take for granted, as did Michelstaedter's 
contemporaries, that the world is false and unjust, but unlike 
*Michelstaedter' s quotes are from his Opere (Florence: Sansoni , 1958), and 
will be given by page number in parentheses. 
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them, we do not take it for all that certain that it necessarily must 
also be boring and melancholic. To the contrary, the age of labor, 
which Michelstaedter has drafted under the name of "rhetorics," 
an age which is founded on fatigue, obedience, and in conclusive 
verbosity, and which concerns itself with the production of 
idealities, such as the judge, the teacher, the executioner, such 
an age seems to be particularly far removed from our present 
situation, or at least from the currently emerging needs. The age 
of "loisir" cannot be, after all, either boring or melancholic: it also 
has to become interesting and efficacious, at any cost. 
This is how a rather surprising and paradoxical turning point 
finds its groundings, with respect not only to Michelstaedter's 
epoch, but also with respect to the general cultural tendency inau-
gurated in the eighties and known as Postmodernism. This ten-
dency, quite predominant up to now, is grounded on a set of 
premises which are the subject of increasing doubts and 
perplexities: for Postmodernism had quite surreptitiously pre-
sumed that the age of "loisir" would be carried by an emotive 
tonality of the cynical-recreative kind, by a class of low profile 
intellectuals, by a philosophical orientation which privileges the 
past. Postmodernism is the child of the reaction to the cultural 
climate produced by the protest movements of the sixties and 
seventies, a climate which was carried by a different emotive 
tonality, of the emphatic and subjective kind; and by a class of 
intellectuals which relegated to itself social leadership, as well as 
by a philosophial orientation which privileged the future. It is 
quite evident that neither the protest movement nor Postmoder-
nism would see in Michelstaedter a precursor. Yet "persuasion" 
offers a third possibility, one which is neither reducible to protest 
nor to Postmodernism. 
This is why to deal with Michelstaedter today means to con-
sider him the point of departure of a new cultural tendency, which 
we might see as an alternative to the protest movement, and to 
Postmodernism as well; it means going beyond merely official 
commemorations, academic publications, and journalistic scoops. 
What it means is the reaffirmation of the possibility of a militant 
culture which would like to be in a somewhat more direct contact 
with society. 
2. STRONG FEELING 
Three basic issues seem to mark this new cultural tendency 
emerging in the wake of Michelstaedter. In the area of emotions, 
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the experience of a strong feeling [forte sentire ]; in the area of social 
interaction, the rise of the high profile intellectual; and in the area 
of philosophical meditation, the development of a philosophy of the 
present. 
The experience of a strong feeling, the experience of "making 
oneself into flame," to use one of Michelstaedter's formulations-
which is the first issue under consideration here-is related to a 
profound dissatisfaction with the Stimmung that marks Postmoder-
nism, that tonality of a cynical-depressive, of a melancholic-recrea-
tive, of a frivolous and fatuous kind. The initial liberational charge 
implicit in the lightness of Postmodernism has completely 
exhausted itself in the disgust for a lifestyle which precludes dif-
ferences and disorders. Postmodernisms oozes with boredom: 
this total acquiescence and consent to universal inconsistencies, 
and this state of misery, when it comes to emotions and feelings, 
ultimately generates a flatness which emanates intellectual preten-
sions only because it somersaults in every direction and, in fact, 
this Postmodern cultural atmosphere has produced a good 
number of people who think of themselves as spirited and funny 
because, as Michelstaedter would say, they reveal "the absolute 
absence of essence in that which has the respect of others" (791). 
But, continues Michelstaedter, "mind [spirito] is the activity of a 
person who aims downwards and not upwards .... Anyone is 
capable of putting something large into something small and then 
mock it." It seems to me quite telling that the Postmodern mind 
arrives at boredom precisely because it is mind which is Post-
modern, such that one senses the need of something more intense 
and more tangible. So a priestess of the Afro-Brasilian cults (mae 
de santo) in Bahia told me a while ago: "Westerners have no longer 
either soul or body, because they consider them opposites. They 
only have mind [spirito]. The world is active," so that priestess 
continued, "it is never neutral, it is always either in our favor or 
against us. The main thing is to see ourselves in a position of 
strength and that we find ourselves in all things." This is why 
neutrality, escapism into the past, and bland Postmodern 
hedonism consume us slowly and imperceptibly, leaving us de-
fenseless. Paraphrasing Sophocles, Michelstaedter quite effec-
tively summarizes in a single sentence that experience of strong 
feeling: "Each one of us finds him/herself in every moment of 
one's life there where it is no longer wise to linger, yet that is the 
culmination of one's work" (37). Thus the acme the moment of 
culmination, does not constitute a rare or privileged moment, a 
dimension of free and intense experience belonging to a distant 
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past or an improbable future, but, rather, it represents a constantly 
present opportunity for those who humbly care to listen to that 
which emerges from the present, to that which is coming [soprag-
giunge] hie et nunc, and to that which is manifested in things. In 
fact, Michelstaedter opposes the person who places him/herself 
before the things, [avanti alle case] who uses things as a means to 
an end, to that person who places him/herself into the things [vive 
nelle case]. The former has an instrumental relation with the world; 
the latter, on the other hand, places desire and pleasure into the 
things qua things, in their essence, that is. The former desires the 
sea, for he/she can swim in it; the latter loves the sea for itself. 
The former loves his/her friend because s/he is useful; the latter, 
the friend qua friend. Now this "strong feeling" is actually a living 
in the things, an allowing for the things to manifest themselves, 
a waiting for a mutual recognition of "those who have a strong 
spark and a simple soul." 
This is wh y the "strong feeling" is essentially quite different 
from the subjectivist vitalism of the protest movement. From a 
Michelstaedterian point of view, there is no doubt that many 
aspects of the protest movement belong to "rhetorics" [rettorica], 
which Michelstaedter defines precisely as an "inadequate asser-
tion of individuality," as the illusory pretense of "constituting a 
person" on the basis of an absolute pretension (60). Be it as it 
may, "strong feeling" is far removed from both the vitalistic em-
phasis of the protest movement as well as from that sentimental 
Postmodern softness . An essential aspect of Michelstaedter's 
thought is precisely his radical critique of vitalism, which he views 
as incapable of living the present, of ever completely reaching 
self-mastery, insatiably demanding from the future to satisfy the 
hunger of the present. The life that vitalism experiences is similar 
to a weight, which, always unable to halt its descent, is falling 
lower and lower, thereby always failing itself . Strong feeling has 
also nothing in common with the modern notion of the "subject" 
and "consciousness:" "the will to live according to its highest 
form, consciousness, lead to self-negation ... . Consciousness can 
never possess itself because at the moment in which it is capable 
of doing so, it ceases to be consciousness" (779). As Pascal once 
said, "nous ne sommes jamais chez nous, nous sommes toujours 
au dela." 
"Strong feeling" implies abandoning that illusory power rela-
tion towards the things of this world: it is necessary to let go of 
that subjective pathos, it is necessary to rid oneself of any arro-
gance, of any Prometheanism, of any absurd pretension of being 
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the master of the world, of the past and the future; and it is 
necessary to remove oneself from that "correlation" and let things 
be and let oneself be like a thing. "Persuasion" is "wanting to 
possess oneself in the things, and in the things oneself" (80). As 
long as needs, projects, desires, the subjective element prevail, I 
am not allowing that things be for themselves and that they man-
ifest themselves for what they are: I continue to see them on the 
basis of my need, my project, my desire: thus it is impossible to 
arrive at a strong experience and at the knowledge of things. 
"Strong feeling" implies, therefore, the disappearance of the sub-
ject which reduces everything to the pettiness and poverty of its 
goals and desires, pleasures and pains. "Strong feeling" is not 
something which originates inside the soul, it is not the expression 
of a subjective feeling which I experience as my own, which be-
longs to me, but rather it is something which arrives from the 
outside, "creating the presence of that which is far away" (51), of 
that which is foreign, other, different. I am nothing but the agency 
of such a feeling. The condition of that strong feeling is the rejec-
tion of subjectivity, it is the making of oneself into nothing and 
nobody, it is the "making of one's life in the desert" (407). It is 
the making oneself a thing [farsi cosa] and the making oneself a flame 
[farsi fiamma]: the most carnal corporeality and the most intense 
love coincide in that "strong feeling": the "amour fou" is born at 
the moment in which I feel my own body and as well as that of 
the other as something external and extraneous, as an object. 
Thus, "strong feeling" opens up an horizon of emotionality which 
is much different from both the protest movement and Postmoder-
nism alike. 
3. THE HIGH INTELLECTUAL PROFILE 
The second aspect which sets the difference between this new 
tendency and Postmodernism on the one hand, and between this 
new tendency and the protest movement on the other, deals with 
the status of the intellectual. Michelstaedter' s intellectual is far 
removed from the low-profile intellectual of Postmodernism, as 
well as from the leader-intellectual of the protest movement. 
In this area too, we must have the courage to recognize that 
the downward homologization of all intellectual activities, which 
we have been witnessing since the mid-seventies, has meanwhile 
exhausted its positive effects. The loss of prestige, the demystifi-
cation, the secularization of the activities of the intellectuals no 
doubt responded to more than legitimate demands: namely, to 
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prevent that the culture would remain separate, isolated from and 
extraneous to the violent and tumultuous growth of the informa-
tion society. This twofold process of a socialization of culture and 
a culturization of society, which the low-profile strategy had set 
into motion, allowed the intellectual to exchange the negative role 
of transgression, indicative of all negative reflection of the seven-
ties, with a positive, managerial, performative role. Postmodern 
intellectuals lack attributes because their work does not consist in 
creating lasting affects, in proposing or sustaining a theory or a 
conception of the world. Rather, it consists in circulating that 
which is already there. This strategy has been even too much on 
the winning side: the Postmodern intellectual succumbs to his/her 
success. The identification of culture and entertainment pursued 
to the point of triviality has created-from the very bottom of the 
age of "loisir" -the demand for specific intellectuals and for crea-
tive forms of work of high stature which would be able to counter 
Postmodern performative indeterminacy. 
It is precisely because of the need for a high-profile intellectual 
that the figure and the work of Michelstaedter can be rescued 
from the metahistorical marginality in which it has been confined 
for three quarters of a century, and can acquire a central place 
not only in European thought but also in the literature of the 
twentieth century. The Michelstaedterian model of the intellectual 
has nothing to do with the notion of leadership, a role which the 
protest movement used to assign to the intellectual. Today society 
is not looking for maitres-a-penser, and Michelstaedter never as-
pired to be one anyhow. "You cannot arrive at persuasion in a 
crowd." The road to health 
is not a bus ride, has no street signs, no indications which can be 
communicated, studied repeated (65); .. . every value placed as 
an absolute value is arbitrary, and whoever entrusts him /herself to 
it and charges it with what s/he feels, must remain an invalid 
forever. But each one must perform his /her own revolution, must 
create him /herself anew, if one wants to achieve life. (70) 
This extreme vindication of the uniqueness and autonomy of ex-
perience is summarized by the sentence "Si duo faciunt idem, 
non est idem" (65). 
After all, the intellectuals of the protest movement and of 
Postmodernism alike are born from frustration, from the feeling 
that insofar as they are intellectuals, they are being cut off from 
the world, from history, from reality. The intellectual of the protest 
movement tries to overcome this extraneousness by positing him/ 
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herself as the master of history, whereas the latter category of 
intellectuals consider themselves as history's servants. We are 
dealing here with two strategies which seem outdated to me, since 
today the intellectual is already world, history, thing. The forma-
tion of a group of acolytes or the fact of being constantly in motion, 
incessantly building cultural networks, by now does not seem to 
add anything to the power of the intellectual. In fact, these ac-
tivities flatten the intellectual in a medium-low dimensionality, 
whose arcana are known to everyone in the street, just as the 
principles of the Reason of State in the seventeenth century were 
known to every cartdriver. Baltasar Gracia.n's aphorisms were 
never as true as they are today: 
The only thing we really possess is time .... Unhappiness is 
wasting precious life in mechanical activities, and equally unhappy 
is wasting one's time in the excesses of lofty activities. One must 
not overload oneself with occupations or with envy: this leads to 
trampling life and to suffocating the soul. ( Oracolo Manuale, Par. 247) 
What the age of "loisir" is asking today from the intellectual 
is precisely what Michelstaedter defines as persuasion, the actual 
possession of oneself. The style of both the protest movement 
and of Postmodernism no longer adds much to the status of the 
intellectual. That direct or indirect self-promotion, executed in 
frenetic pulsations, is no longer necessary, precisely because it 
happens to be this frenetic self-promotion which diminishes the 
intellectual' s credibility. Through it, in fact, one offers oneself not 
as real to oneself (59), while simultaneously having to be the thing 
that one is. 
The figure of a high-profile intellectual as evoked by 
Michelstaedter again turns on the age-old problem of the subject 
of literature, that is, of the author. The intellectuals of the protest 
movement grounded their legitimacy in the group in whose name 
they spoke. The Postmodern intellectuals instead tended to lose 
themselves in the network of cultural relations they were weaving. 
It seems quite appropriate to ask, therefore, whether the high-pro-
file intellectuals represent a return of a strong authorial subject. 
I doubt it. Hardly a return, the new tendency is rather a new 
phenomenon. 
The high-profile intellectual is not a subject, it is a thing. And 
it is around this thing that the traces are organized. Those traces 
are only in part authorial (true works and occasional writings), 
many are in fact non-authorial (i.e., iconographic documentation, 
MARIO PERNIOLA 47 
his library, his tomb, and so forth). And even those traces which 
are somewhat authorial, even those more subjective ones as au-
tobiographies, letters, or diaries, those also must not be considred 
the expression of a subject, but, rather, they must be understood 
as things which determine something more overarching which 
gathers them. After all, it is implicit in the very essence of writing 
to be a thing, to be something irreducible to the transcription of 
the voice, to the breath of spirit. In Postmodernism this essential 
dimension of writing was finally cancelled by the ephemeral en-
tertainment of readers and writers alike. In this new tendency 
sketched here, the essential dimension of writing, namely, its 
being trace, is extended to everything, and that inaugurates a new 
category of high-profile writers and readers. The social legitimacy 
of this new class of high-profile writers and readers does not 
derive from the pretension of constructing a sort of aristocracy of 
the spirit in a world which appears to be sliding towards barbarism 
and ignorance, but, rather, that legitimacy derives from the sen-
sation of being in direct contact with the emerging age of the 
thing, which follows the age of the image. Michelstaedter under-
lines with great effectiveness the difference between weak writers 
(who would probably better be called scribblers) and strong writers 
(that is, a writer in the real sense of the word). The former never 
arrive at saying the thing, although they keep saying many things, 
dragging along their lives while gradually accommodating them-
selves to necessary continuities. The latter feel that they must say 
"the whole thing always and in every instance ." 
4. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRESENT 
To prefer the present to both the past and the future is the 
third aspect which differentiates this new tendency from Post-
moderism and the protest movement alike. The utopia of the 
protest movement of the sixties and seventies essentially consisted 
in the prefiguration of a time to come; the hermeneutics of the 
eighties focus on the academic-bureacratic management of the 
past. Returning to Michelstaedter now means to uphold a third 
perspective which would like to "hold one's life in the present" 
(278). The protest movement lived off faith and hope . The result 
was delusion and frustration. Michelstaedter is the implacable 
critic of a behavior which is totally projected towards the future. 
His view on this topic is very effectively expressed by the following 
Venetian saying: 
One hopes that stones 
might become bread 
so that the poor 
can eat them . 
One hopes that water 
becomes champagne 
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so that we don't complain 
about this celebration. 
One hopes that by hoping 
the time will come 
that everything will go to hell 
so not to hope any longer. 
(36-37) 
Se spera che isassi 
deventa paneti, 
perche i povareti 
li possa magnar. 
Se spera che l' acqua 
deventa sciampagna 
perche no i se lagna 
de sto giubilar. 
Se spera sperando 
che vegnera l' ord 
de andar in malora 
per piu no sperar. 
48 
Postmodernism, on the other hand, lived off disillusionment and 
entertainment; the result was melancholy and boredom. In an 
article dedicated to Tolstoi, Michelstaedter writes words which 
very well describe the Postmodern condition: 
We look around us: we live in a world of corpses; corpses who eat, 
drink, sleep, talk but nevertheless do not cease to be corpses. (651) 
If the protesters had the souls of fanatics, the Postmoderns have 
the souls of fakirs. 
A philosophy of the present is also a philosophy of presence. 
As such it stands at the opposite pole of negative thought and 
the various forms which it has recently adopted: Crisis of reason, 
nihilism, weak thought, and so forth. "The one who strongly 
desires life ... asks to possess it now" (36). That person does 
not complain about the absence of anything, nor does that person 
regret the lack of anything, nor mourn the loss of value and 
positive entities. First of all, because values and ideals have always 
been too unreal, too abstract: "the person who has no longer any 
needs, no longer has any values" (358). Secondly, because any-
thing positive which the past transmits will be appropriated, taken 
in, and made alive in the present. "At every point, in the present 
moment of affirmation, there is the intimacy of the most distant 
things" (50). The minds which are inspired by Michelstaedter 
neither consider the world an empty entity, nor do they view 
society under the sign of a kenosis; the health of which Michelstaed-
ter speaks presupposes the image of a full world, of a pleroma, in 
which everything which is important is available (365). Health 
means, in fact, to remove oneself from need, it means to con-sist 
in the midst of th ings, "to go through activity toward peace" (52). 
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Yet that peace is not something immobile and eternal. 
Michelstaedter's point of arrival is not metaphysics: his thought 
is essentially oriented towards historical reality, towards the 
phenomenon, the thing. The horizon in which it moves is an 
horizon opened by the historical world. However, contrary to 
those who pursue history because they understand it (maybe 
rightly so) as something external to themselves, the Michelstaedte-
rian idea of presence is itself history in the strongest form. Its 
militancy does not derive from the subjective will of the thinker, 
from "engagement," but rather it is inherent in the direct contact 
[presa diretta], so to speak, between thought and the world of 
history. The present is something more than the object of 
philosophy: it thinks itself through philosophy. The thinker is 
actually the person who, in order to be able to listen to the present 
in all its paradoxes and differences, makes him/herself into no-
thing and no-one. It is the person who silences desires, inordinate 
affections, and opinions so as to not pose obstacles and misleading 
schemes to the understanding of the manifestations of history. It 
is the person who makes him/herself into the single conduit of 
phenomena, their place of transit, their gateway to phenomena 
which surprise, upset, and amaze us, which constantly present 
themselves in an unexpected and unpredictable way. 
But in which way does a thinker become such a pure conduit 
of the present? Both protesters and postmoderns ignored that this 
event takes place in the reading and in the writing process; they 
ignored that the "thinker" is essentially a reader and writer. Even 
on this level the figure of Michelstaedter, in whom philosophy 
and literature are bound together by a relationship of mutual 
belonging, appears to be quite exemplary. "The immorality of a 
person who speaks without 'persuasion,"' writes Michelstaedter, 
"manifests itself in every world that is born from the pen, because 
of its vague, arbitrary, limited content and because of the incohe-
rent, albeit easily and vulgarly satisfied, connection." (708) Now 
the meeting ground between philosophy and literature to which 
this tendency inspired by Michelstaedter leads, is precisely the 
opposite of this vagueness: it aspires to the determination of the 
thing and to its perfection. It is on account of this issue that the 
militant culture should "blow up the bridges during retreat," and 
allow itself to grasp the essentials: strong feeling, intellectual high 
profile, and intimate connection [presa diretta] with the present 
are the three moments in which the central role of reading and 
writing in history manifests itself. 
